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Abstract
The available experimental evidence suggests that even two-person normal form
games with an elementary action space present substantial degrees of cognitive diÆ-
culty. We submit that the relational structure of the players' preferences is a source of
complexity of a game. We provide a formal classication of order structures in two-person
normal form games, based on the two properties of monotonicity and projectivity, and
present an experiment on individual ability to construct a representation of bi-ordered
sets isomorphic to the preference structure of paradigmatic normal form games. Experi-
mental results support the hypothesis that relational complexity matters. In particular,
they support Schelling's intuition that `mixed motive games' are harder to represent
than `pure motive' ones. In addition, the experiment shows that most subjects tend
to perceive and extract monotonic relations from non-projective ones. We show that
individuals' short term memory capacity limitations signicantly aect their ability to
correctly represent bi-orders. Some connections with Rubinstein's analysis of binary
relations in natural language are also shortly discussed.
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1 Introduction
Thomas Schelling reports John Strachey, the former British Defense Minister, telling him that
although he had known that conict could coexist with common interest, he had thought that
the two were inherently separable, and had never considered them as part of an integrated
structure (Schelling 1980, vi). Strachey's words capture very neatly an important idea in
Schelling's (1960) book: representing others' strategic motivations may be a source of cognitive
diÆculty for players when coordination and conict motives are intertwined in the same game.
For this purpose Schelling introduces a basic and important distinction between \pure mo-
tive" and \mixed motive" games. The former are games in which preferences of players are
rank-correlated, as in the prototypical examples of pure coordination games (positive corre-
lation) and conict games (negative correlation). The latter games present a more complex,
non correlated structure of preferences, blending coordination opportunities with antagonistic
motivations. The point Schelling makes is that while pure motive games are generally easy to
grasp, mixed motive games are puzzling and inherently harder to understand. He strikingly
remarks that while our vocabulary is rich of words designating common interest or adversarial
relationships, there are no words to designate the relation between players in a mixed motive
game: we have a rich lexicon for partners or for opponents, but how to designate someone
who is a partner and an opponent at the same time?
While Schelling's typology has received little attention in subsequent developments of game
theory (an important exception being Harsanyi, 1977), it has sometimes surfaced in attempts
to provide game theoretic prescriptive advice to decision makers. For example, Adam Branden-
burger and Barry Nalebu's (1996) bestseller makes a central argument that managers seldom
correctly identify the peculiar mix of competition and cooperation hidden in most business
interactions (they feel a revealing need to ll the gap in our dictionaries, coining the hybrid
word: co-opetition). Anecdotal evidence from the history of decision making also abounds; for
example, Robert McNamara's (1999) recent reappraisal of \missed opportunities" during the
Vietnam war provides a rich sample of episodes in which decision makers from both conicting
parties essentially failed to recognize the existence of possible cooperation within conict.
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In this paper, we experimentally address the cognitive issue raised by Schelling's distinc-
tion between pure and mixed motive games. In particular, we want to investigate the extent
to which decision making in strategic situations of a mixed motive nature may be aected by
the diÆculty to correctly represent the underlying game structure in terms of the relations
of players' preferences over outcomes. Hence, we focus precisely on possible representational
failures that could be at the basis of observed strategic behavior. However, rather than explor-
ing it in the context of a decision making experimental task, we take a more radical semantic
stance, and look directly at the cognitive diÆculties in representing intertwined order relations
which are isomorphic to the preference structures of some classical games. Although such an
approach obviously misses important behavioral ingredients typical of an interactive situa-
tion, we claim that our experimental strategy may help to disentangle representational factors
from other cognitive and behavioral components, and may provide a broader perspective on
the diÆculties of correctly representing strategic settings. We also propose a ner classica-
tion of relational structures in mixed-motive games, introducing the property of projectivity.
Projectivity and its complement (non-projectivity) well capture, in our view, the degree of
entanglement of multiple order relations, as will be better claried in the next section.
Our results conrm the appropriateness of such ner classication to understand individ-
ual failures in representing complex relational structures. They also conrm that Schelling's
insight was essentially correct, and that order relations associated to mixed motive games are
signicantly more diÆcult to represent than those mirroring pure motive games. In addition,
we show that individuals, when confronted with entangled order relations, tend to perceive out
of the whole picture only subsets of elements which are simply (i.e. monotonically) related, as
is the case with players' preferences in pure motive games. This preliminary result may sug-
gest that individuals, out of a situation involving both conict and coordination components,
tend to perceive and extract only one of the two relations and ignore the other - or, like John
Strachey, to separate them and ignore their interrelations.
Finally, we show that failures in representing order structures isomorphic to mixed motive
games are correlated with individual short term memory capacity, and thus seem to be rooted
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in a fundamental cognitive bottleneck.
Section 2 of the paper shortly introduces a formal classication of bi-ordered structures,
which can be applied to preference relations in two-person games. Section 3 presents an exper-
iment on the representation of such dierent structures. Section 4 discusses some implications
of our results and suggests further experimental developments.
2 Bi-orders and preference structures
A game is usually composed of strategies, players (including Nature), and payos which deter-
mine the players' preferences over the possible game outcomes. Sources of cognitive diÆculty
for individuals may in principle arise from any of these elements alone, or, possibly, from
their combination. The complexity of the strategy space is indeed an important source of
constraints to players' full rationality in games (chess being the paradigmatic example: e.g.,
Simon and Scheer, 1992), as partisans of bounded rationality have often suggested, and as
an abounding experimental evidence by now conrms.
Much less attention, however, has been paid so far to possible cognitive diÆculties arising
from the structure of preferences implied by a game
1
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This diuse neglect notwithstanding, there is increasing evidence that players can expe-
rience serious diÆculties in reasoning strategically even in games in which the action space
is indeed trivial, as in very simple normal form games (e.g., Stahl and Wilson, 1994; Goeree
and Holt, 1999; Devetag, Legrenzi and Warglien, 1999; Costa-Gomez, Crawford, and Broseta,
2001). Since in these games strategic complexity cannot arise from the action space, we sug-
gest that one should look at the structure of players' preferences as an important source of
diÆculty for strategic thinking in such situations. After all, what distinguishes a game situ-
ation from an individual decision making task is the need to jointly take into account both
one's own and the other players' preferences, and this may indeed be non-trivial even in those
cases in which the strategy space is not exceedingly complicated.
1
Ariel Rubinstein has recently shown some constraints on dening preferences in a simple propositional
language: see Rubinstein (2000, ch. 4).
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In what follows, we restrict our attention to simple, two-person normal form game struc-
tures. A peculiar feature of two-person strategic form games is that the outcomes of strategy
proles (i.e., the cells of the bi-matrix) constitute a bi-ordered set, as the preference order of
both players is imposed on them. In order to reason strategically on the game, hence, a player
must mentally represent two preference orders, her own and the other player's.
In general, bi-orders can have structures of dierent complexity. A useful typology of
bi-orders, which originated in algebraic linguistics (Marcus, 1967; Schreider, 1975; Mel'cuk,
1988) and which is largely used in the theory of parsing, distinguishes levels of intricacy in
the interrelation between two orders on the same set using the properties of monotonicity and
projectivity.
Before introducing a few formal denitions, an informal presentation of such properties
may be useful.
A bi-order is a pair of order relations (say,  and <) on a set S. Let's assume for the
sake of simplicity that both relations are linear orders
2
. A bi-order is monotonic if one
relation preserves the order of the other (the bi-order is isotonic) or just reverses it (the
bi-order is antitonic). Projectivity can be intuitively expressed by saying that if one writes
down the sequence of elements of S according to the < relation, and draws the arrows directly
subordinating (i.e., covering) the same elements according to , the covering arrows should
never cross each other. Finally, a bi-order is non-projective when it is not projective. Non
projectivity can be intuitively expressed by saying that there is no way to arrange the sequence
of elements of S according to the < relationship, in such a way that the  arrows never cross
each other.
Fig. 1 shows an example with four elements and two dierent types of arrows - continuous
and dashed - representing the covering relations of < and  respectively.
= Fig. 1 here =
2
One can generalize denitions to non strict order relations and to the case in which one of the relations is
a tree. See for example Schreider (1975).
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More formally:
DEFINITION 1: Monotonic projectivity :
Let a
i
, a
j
2 S, and let  and < be two linear order relations dened on S; a doubly ordered
set S is called isotonically projective if:
for i 6= j a
i
< a
j
i a
i
 a
j
It is called antitonically projective if:
for i 6= j a
i
< a
j
i a
j
 a
i
It is called monotonically projective if it is isotonically projective or antitonically projective.
DEFINITION 2: Projectivity :
Let a
i
, a
j
, a
k
2 S, and let  and < be two linear order relations dened on S; furthermore,
let  be the covering relation of  
3
. A doubly ordered set S is called projective if one and
only one of the following conditions holds:
a) (strict projectivity) for a
i
6= a
j
6= a
k
, a
i
 a
j
and min(a
i
, a
j
) < a
k
< max(a
i
, a
j
) imply
the relation a
k
 a
j
.
b) (quasi-projectivity) for a
i
6= a
j
6= a
k
, a
i
 a
j
and min(a
i
, a
j
) < a
k
< max(a
i
, a
j
) imply
the relation a
i
 a
k
.
DEFINITION 3: Non projectivity :
A bi-ordered set is called non projective if it is neither monotonically projective neither pro-
jective.
Since monotonic projectivity is nested into projectivity, one can naturally hypothesize a
hierarchy of cognitive diÆculty: monotonic projective structures are easier to represent than
projective (but non monotonic) structures, which in turn are easier to represent than non
projective ones. Furthermore, since antitonic projective structures require to reverse one order
to obtain the other one, it is reasonable to expect that they may be (slightly) more diÆcult
3
The covering relation for linear orders is usually dened as follows (Davey and Priestley, 1990). Given an
ordered set A, a linear order relation  and a
i
, a
j
, a
k
2 A, a
j
covers a
i
(a
i
 a
j
) if a
i
 a
j
implies that
there are no a
k
such that: a
i
 a
k
 a
i
.
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than isotonic projective structures
4
.
Two-person games are bi-ordered structures: we hypothesize that the cognitive diÆculty
in representing a game should depend, among other things, on the specic structure of prefer-
ences. Pure motive games are monotonically projective structures - in which the two preference
relations perfectly coincide - thus they are the easiest to represent; mixed motive games can
be of two types: projective ones (like for example \chicken games") or non projective ones
(like for example PD's). The latter should be harder to represent, and therefore understand,
than the former.
3 Representing bi-orders
Our central claim is that there are cognitive constraints in jointly representing multiple order
relationships. This constraint seems not specic of game playing only, as the example of
language suggests. Thus, we expect to nd it in more general representation tasks. In order
to test our hypothesis, we designed a very simple experiment in which subjects were provided
with a set of objects that could be ordered by two types of order relations and had to select
a subset of them that satises such order relations. In semantic terms, the task consists
in representing a state of aairs (a \world") that satises a formula built up with two order
relations. In particular, we tested the hypothesis that dierent bi-orders induce dierent levels
of representational diÆculty. As the reader will remind, we hypothesize the following order
of diÆculty: non projective B projective (but non monotonic) B antitonically projective B
isotonically projective, with B indicating the \more diÆcult than" relation.
The elements our experimental subjects had to deal with were squares which diered along
4
Linguistics provide some support to this claim in the domain of language. Language is a system that has
multiple order structures simultaneously acting on it: there is the sequential order of words in a phrase, as
well as many other layers of syntactical (and semantic) order. For example, to parse a phrase we must be able
to recognize and process altogether such order relations. Empirical analysis (see Marcus (1967, ch. VI) for a
review) has shown that near 100% of natural language sentences are projective (with non-projective sentences
usually conned to literary usage).
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the two features of SIZE and COLOR (actually, shades of grey): see g. 2.
= Fig. 2 here =
Squares are very familiar objects, and size and color are equally familiar order relations,
henceforth we expected that no peculiar diÆculties could arise in understanding them. There
was a set of 16 squares, and subjects had to select, out of this set, four squares which would
satisfy simultaneously two order relations (size and color) given to them. The experiment was
computerized, of the \drag and drop" type (Fig. 8 reports a sample of the computer screen).
The upper part of the screen reported the 16 squares from which subjects had to select their
\building blocks". Four empty cells in the bottom part of the screen were the TARGET to
be lled in with squares taken from the upper part so as to satisfy the formula. Instructions
(see Appendix) explained to subjects the meaning of order relations and provided examples.
Instructions also stressed the fact that the particular position of the four squares in the
TARGET area of the screen did not matter, as long as the four squares satised the two order
relations given. In order to perform the task, subjects had simply to click with the mouse on
one of the squares in the table and \drag" it into one of the cells in the TARGET.
The pairs of relations given to subjects (see below) were order-isomorphic to payo struc-
tures in four well known 2  2 strategic games (g. 3).
= Fig. 3 here =
The reader can easily check from g. 3 that the structure of preferences in a pure coordi-
nation game with Pareto-ranked equilibria is isotonically projective. A pure antagonism game
corresponds to antitonic projectivity. The projective case is drawn using the chicken game as
a template, while the non-projective case is modelled after a Prisoner's Dilemma.
Thus, the following four pairs of order relations were given to subjects:
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 isotonic projectivity (monotonic)
S(W ) > S(Z) > S(Y ) > S(X)
C(W )! C(Z)! C(Y )! C(X)
 antitonic projectivity (monotonic)
S(W ) > S(Z) > S(Y ) > S(X)
C(X)! C(Y )! C(Z)! C(W )
 projectivity (non-monotonic)
S(X) > S(Y ) > S(Z) > S(W )
C(Z)! C(Y )! C(X)! C(W )
 non-projectivity
S(X) > S(Y ) > S(Z) > S(W )
C(W )! C(Y )! C(Z)! C(X)
S denotes SIZE and C denotes COLOR. The four squares are labelled X, Y, Z, and W.
We rst ran an experimental session at the University of Venice with a pool of 30 subjects
who were students enrolled in a Master in Business Administration. They had a monetary
incentive to respond correctly, as they were paid a xed fee for their participation, plus an
amount of $3 for each correct answer given in the task. The pool was divided into two sub-
groups in which the order of presentation of the four tasks was varied, in order to control for
transfer of experience eects. Table 1 reports the two diering sequences presented.
= Table 1 here =
We then replicated the experiment with identical conditions at the Computable and Exper-
imental Economics Lab of the University of Trento, using a pool of 40 undergraduate students
recruited by posting ads at the various department buildings. We rst report, in two separate
tables, the number of correct responses per task for the Venice and Trento pools respectively
(see tables 2 and 3), and distinguishing between the two subgroups.
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= Table 2 here =
= Table 3 here =
Dierences in the number of correct answers between the two sub-groups in each of the four
tasks were not found to be statistically signicant by a Fisher exact test in both the Venice
and Trento pool: therefore we can refer to the pooled data in the last column of the two
tables. The rst thing to notice by looking at aggregate results is that, notwithstanding the
relatively better performance of the Trento subjects in each task, the observed frequencies of
correct answers in both pools suggest an order of diÆculty that exactly mirrors our hypothesis:
relations which are monotonically projective are relatively easy to construct, with the isotonic
one easier than the antitonic. On the contrary, non-monotonic projective and non-projective
bi-orders seem relatively more diÆcult. No statistical dierences were found between the
results obtained in the two experiments (Fisher's exact test), therefore from now on we refer
to the pooled data (see table 4).
= Table 4 here =
Clearly, aggregate analysis alone is not informative in this experiment, as the single obser-
vations (performance in each task) are not independent. Hence, we subsequently performed
non-parametric tests on the strings of successes (1) and failures (0) in the four tasks to test
against the null hypothesis that these were randomly distributed across subjects.
A Cochran test performed on the four related samples allows to reject the null hypothesis
that the correct answers in the tasks are equally distributed at the 1% signicance level
5
. We
can hence reject the null hypothesis that the four tasks presented an identical level of diÆculty
for our subjects.
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Cochran's Q = 52.796, p < :000.
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23 subjects made no mistakes in any of the four tasks, while 2 subjects made the highest
possible number (4) of mistakes. Disregarding these 25 subjects' performances as noninfor-
mative, of the remaining 45 subjects, 35 (78%) behaved in accordance with our conjecture,
i.e., they made mistakes in a way that did not violate our hypothesized hierarchy of diÆculty.
In particular, 17 subjects made a mistake only in the non-projective task, 9 constructed both
monotonic bi-orders correctly but made mistakes in the projective and non-projective tasks,
and 9 correctly constructed only the isotonic case. Hence, out of the 16 possible combinations
(strings) of successes and failures, the three that are compatible with our hypothesis are highly
prominent in the data
6
.
We subsequently made pairwise comparisons by applying a McNemar test. All dierences
between pairs are statistically signicant
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except the dierence between the antitonic and the
projective bi-order (p = :096).
Hence, the data seem to conrm our hypothesis in all but the antitonic-projective pair. In
this case, in fact, although observed frequencies suggest the validity of our conjecture, further
experiments are needed.
Additional insight can be gathered by conducting an analysis of the most common types
of errors that subjects made. While mistakes in the \projective" task show a relatively high
variance, mistakes in the \non-projective" task show a rather revealing pattern. In fact, of
the thirty-nine subjects who did not answer correctly in this task, twenty (51:3%) constructed
an antitonic bi-order, while fteen (38:5%) constructed an isotonic bi-order.
Thus, as we hypothesized, individuals, out of a non-projective pair of relations, tend to
simplify their representations by perceiving and extracting monotonic bi-orders.
6
These observed frequencies were not found to be dierent between the Venice and Trento pool by a Fisher's
exact test.
7
Isotonic-antitonic bi-order: p = :002; isotonic-non-projective bi-order: p = :000; isotonic-projective bi-
order: p = :000; antitonic-non projective bi-order: p = :022; non projective-projective bi-order: p = :003;
McNemar test.
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4 Short term memory capacity and representation
Why should some bi-order structures be harder to represent than others? Research in the
psychology of mental models (Johnson-Laird 1983) has repeatedly - although not conclusively
- suggested that short -term memory constraints may hinder the individual ability to edit a
complete, accurate mental representation of a given task-environment. Since the pioneering
work of George Miller (1956), it is well-known that we can hold only a limited amount of
information active in our short-term memory, which is a basic bottleneck in human information
processing. Thus, complex structures may overload individual short-term memory capacity,
causing incomplete, over-simplied and often mistaken representations of such structures. The
load on short-term memory capacity can be reduced by the ability to compress information
or decompose it in smaller components.
Clearly, bi-order structures dier in the way information can be compressed or decomposed.
For example, isotone bi-orders can be simply processed as a single order; while antitone ones
can be easily obtained by reversing a single order. The case for projective and non-projective
bi-orders is less trivial. However, projective structures naturally generate a proper decompo-
sition in a tree of constituents. To see this, it suÆces to bracket each pair of elements related
by the covering relation of  . For example, exploiting the usual order of parentheses and
starting from the least element of the chain ordered by , one obtains the bracketing shown
in g. 4 in the case of a projective bi-order:
= Fig. 4 here =
This bracketing is \proper", meaning that parentheses are nested. It corresponds to the
tree order of the bracketed constituents shown in g. 5:
= Fig. 5 here =
Projectivity implies that a proper bracketing always arises. This follows naturally from
the property that the arrows do not intersect in projective bi-orders.
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On the contrary, it is easy to see that non-projective structures fail to generate such
decomposition, as it is shown in g. 6:
= Fig. 6 here =
Consequently, there are good reasons to hypothesize that the short term memory load of
editing the representation of a projective bi-order is signicantly lowered by the possibility of
decomposing it into a tree of constituents (which even a simple stack memory device could
easily manage: see Hopcroft and Ullman, 1979). Non-projective bi-orders do not present such
a decomposability property, and thus force to consider simultaneously all elements and their
order relations.
It has been shown that individuals dier in their short-term memory capacity (Miller,
1956; Baddeley, 1990). If short-term memory capacity limitations are a source of diÆculty
in representing bi-orders, one should expect that the rate of success of individuals in our
experiment may be correlated with individual memory capacity.
In order to test this hypothesis, we conducted on 38 subjects (those participating to the
second session of our experiment) a standard Wechsler digit span test for short memory ca-
pacity (e.g., Walsch and Betz, 1990). The test consists in asking subjects to repeat a series of
digits, which are to be read by the experimenter at the rate of one digit per second. The test
is conducted sequentially on two independent sets of digit series of increasing length. For each
set, the test stops when the participants fails to correctly repeat a given series. The subject's
`score' in each set is given by the length of the last series that was repeated correctly (so, for
example, if a subject fails to correctly repeat a series of length 6, her score will be equal to
5). The subject's nal score is then given by the higher score that was achieved in the two
independent sets. Although the score needs not directly reect the number of `short term
memory slots' available to a subject, it is generally assumed that higher scores correspond to
a higher short term memory capacity.
Table 5 reports the correlation between subjects' score in the memory test and the num-
ber of correct responses in the representation experiment. We computed the two standard
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Spearman rho and Kendall tau rank-correlation tests. Both tests support our hypothesis of
a signicant correlation between individual short-term memory capacity and performance in
the experiment.
= Table 5 here =
5 Discussion and conclusion
Was Schelling right, then? Our experiment provides indirect support to the view that not
all normal form games are the \same", and that structural complexity matters; we suggest
that besides the action space, relational structure is a further source of cognitive diÆculty,
providing a ner classication of two-person games. \Pure motive" games (i.e. monotonic
payo structures) are easier to represent, and even in the presence of \mixed motive" games,
such simpler structures act as irresistible templates of interaction. We also suggest that a
further classication, involving the property of projectivity, may be useful, although more
data gathering is needed to fully support such claim. Of course, a more direct test requires
to move into the domain of experimental games. In a companion paper (Warglien, Devetag
and Legrenzi, 2000) we provide some evidence that experimental behavior in simple normal
form games may reect the diÆculty to reason through a complete representation of the game
structure. Furthermore, a recent experiment by Oechssler and Schipper (2000) lends some
support to our hypotheses. In this experiment, subjects play repeatedly a 2X2 normal form
game, in which the payos of their opponents are not revealed to them. After 15 rounds,
they are asked to guess the order structure of their opponent's payos. It turns out that the
diÆculty of correctly guessing the game structure substantially mirrors our classication of
relational complexity; furthermore, an analysis of players' mistakes reveals that they often
guess a game structure of lesser ordinal complexity than the `real one', while the opposite
never happens.
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In addition, we submit that monotonic structures may indeed be the prevailing templates of
bi-orders available in memory. In a classroom experiment, students asked to provide examples
of four arbitrary objects satisfying simultaneously two arbitrary order relations of the kind
depicted in g. 1 had no diÆculties in nding examples for monotonic bi-orders (such as
\richer is happier" or \larger towns are less healthy"); but they found it almost impossible
to provide examples for non-projective bi-orders. This point reinforces the result that in
our experiment subjects unable to provide a solution to the non-projective case resorted to
monotonic orderings of the squares. Returning to games, it also suggests that in incomplete
information games \friends" and \enemies" may be the most natural player types.
Further research would need to identify more precisely a causal relation between failures
to represent the mixed motive nature of strategic situations when this is present, and certain
behavioral patterns. Some encouraging evidence in this sense comes from a recent experiment
on complex multi-issue negotiations (Hyder, Prietula, and Weingart, 2000). The authors of the
study observe that negotiators rarely achieve a Pareto-optimal solution to a given negotiation
problem, and they argue that the reason lies in their incorrect `default' representation of
the situation as a zero-sum game. In fact, representing the game as zero-sum would trigger
the almost exclusive use of distributive negotiation tactics (i.e., tactics aimed at achieving
unilateral concessions from the other party) at the expense of integrative tactics, which would
instead facilitate the achievement of agreements resulting in gains for both parties involved.
Hence, the use of specic behavioral strategies conducting to sub-optimal agreements seems
to derive, according to the authors, by an original failure of players to represent the mutual
gain area in the space of solution points.
In a dierent although related direction, the evidence of short term memory capacity
eects on representation of complex structures may point at an important cognitive source
of behavioral heterogeneity. While short term memory capacity limitations have often been
invoked in discussions on bounded rationality, there is indeed very little empirical research
aimed at testing how such limitations aect economic behavior and, in particular, strategic
interaction (a few recent exceptions include Rapoport and Budescu, 1992, and Kareev, 1992).
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Our results further encourage a systematic exploration of such issue in economically relevant
settings.
Finally, our results may provide some complementary cognitive ground to Ariel Rubin-
stein's (1996) argument on the prevalence of linear order structures in discourse. Rubinstein
claims that linear orders have some eÆciency properties (in indicating an element out of a set,
in being informative about a relation on a set, in minimizing the number of examples necessary
to describe a relation) that justify the higher frequency with which such structures appear in
natural language. Clearly, one can construct a structure-preserving map from a monotonic
bi-order to a linear order, either directly (as in the isotonic case) or with an intermediate step
by reversing one of the two order relations (as in the antitonic case). The same cognitive
constrains that make monotonic bi-orders easier to represent may underlie the prevalence of
linear orders in natural language. Projectivity is a more complex case: no simple way to
reduce it to a single linear order can be found. Yet, projectivity can be thought of as a kind
of compatibility between order relations, simplifying the task of managing bi-orders in short
term memory. The relevance of the projectivity property in natural language suggests that
further connections with Rubinstein's argument are worth seeking.
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APPENDIX: INSTRUCTIONS
In the following experiment you will be asked to answer some questions regarding order rela-
tions between elements. An order relation, as the term itself indicates, allows some elements
of a set to be ordered according to a certain characteristic.
For example, an order relation can be dened according to SIZE: given a set of rectangles,
I can say whether rectangle X is bigger, smaller or equal to rectangle Y; I can also order a set
of rectangles from the smallest to the biggest, and vice-versa.
In the following experiment we will ask you to respond some questions about objects
according to which two order relations can be dened: one on the basis of SIZE, the other on
the basis of COLOR.
We will use the canonical symbols of order relations:
> < =
In the case of SIZE, the meaning of the three symbols is obvious and intuitive. For example,
the expression X > Y indicates that element X is bigger than element Y.
In the case of COLOR, you will be proposed four colors: black, white, and two variations
of gray. It will be set by convention that the symbol > means \darker than".
In the following tasks, SIZE will be indicated by the letter S, and COLOR by the letter C.
Two objects can be dened according to both characteristics. For example, in the following
case
= Fig. 7 here =
the left circle (X) is bigger than the right circle (Y), but the right circle is darker than the
left circle. This double order relation will be expressed in the following way: S(X) > S(Y ),
and C(X) < C(Y ).
Obviously, saying that S(X) > S(Y ) is equivalent to saying that S(Y ) < S(X). Therefore,
the two notations will be used interchangeably.
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In the experiment you will be presented four dierent pairs of order relations with regard
to SIZE and COLOR, with each pair being dened over four elements (squares). The four
squares will always be indicated with the letters X, Y, W and Z, while color and size will be
denoted with C and S.
The task will be computerized. Your computer screen will visualize a set of 16 squares of
dierent colors and sizes, and four empty cells. You will have to ll in the four empty cells with
4 squares (chosen out of the 16) which, according to you, satisfy the pair of order relations
that will be provided to you. In order to accomplish the task, you will simply have to click
with your mouse on the chosen squares and drag them to the empty cells in the TARGET.
For each correct answer, you will be assigned 50 points, which will be converted in cash at the
exchange rate of L. 100 per point and paid to you privately at the end of the experiment.
The four empty cells are numbered from 1 to 4 so that the software can recognize them.
However, the specic position of the single squares in the cells is irrelevant. In other words,
the four squares that you choose can be placed in the empty cells in any position you prefer.
It is only important that they satisfy the pair of order relations assigned.
Further, we ask you to carefully read the single pairs of relations given. In this type of
experiments it is easy to commit mistakes my simply misreading the data.
In order to begin the experiment, you will have to insert your identication number in the
\number" window on your screen and then click OK. After this, the screen will display a set
of squares on the left and some written text on the right. Before the actual experiment starts,
you will go through a brief training session.
Please, we ask you to do the experiment in silence. Thank you.
= Fig. 8 here =
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sequence antit. proj. non proj.
isot. proj. proj.
non proj. isot. proj.
proj. antit. proj.
Table 1: The two sequences presented
group 1 (N=14) group 2 (N=16) Tot. N=30
N. of correct answers number perc. number perc. perc.
Isot.proj. 13 93% 15 94% 93%
Antit. proj. 9 64% 12 75% 70%
Proj. 7 50% 10 62.5% 56.7%
Non proj. 6 42.8% 6 37.5% 40%
Table 2: Number and percentages of correct answers in the four tasks in the Venice pool
group 1 (N=20) group 2 (N=20) Tot. N=40
N. of correct answers number perc. number perc. perc.
Isot.proj. 19 95% 19 95% 95%
Antit. proj. 15 75% 18 90% 82.5%
Proj. 15 75% 14 70% 72.5%
Non proj. 10 50% 9 45% 47.5%
Table 3: Number and percentages of correct answers in the four tasks in the Trento pool
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task correct answers
isotonic 66 (94.3%)
antitonic 54 (77%)
projective 46 (65.8%)
non-projective 31 (44.3%)
Table 4: Correct answers pooled across sessions
Correlation coeÆcient Signicance (one-tailed)
Kendall's tau :310 :05
Spearman's rho :362 :05
Table 5: Correlation coeÆcients between individual score in the Wechsler digit span test and
the number of correct responses in the experiment
A B C D isotonic projectivity
antitonic projectivity
non monotonic
projectivity
non projectivityA B C D
A B C D
A B C D
Figure 1: Four examples of bi-order structures
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Figure 2: The 16 squares given to subjects
YZW
4,4
3,3
2,2
1,1
XYZW
4,1 2,3
3,2 1,4
X Y Z W
3,3 2,4
4,2 1,1
X Y Z W
1,4
4,1 2,2
3,3
X
Figure 3: The four experimental tasks
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